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) 
[Crim. No. GGl7. In Bank. Aug. 23, 1960.] 
'fHE PEOPLE, Rl'spondt'llt, v. JEWEI1L ASHBY GOULD 
C't a1., Appellants. 
[11 Burglary-Evidence.-Thou;;h the prosecuting witness' iden-
tification of 0111' of two del'endants as the Ulan she saw in her 
npartment was inconelu,<ive, where her testimony adequately 
established that a burglary was committed, such defendant's 
admissions after his arrest that he took "a few dollars" from 
the location and that he didll't recall whether he "shimmed 
the door or the door was legally unlocked" eould be used to 
identify him as one of the burglars and sustained the jury's 
finding that he participated in the crime. 
[2] Id.-Evidence.-Though the prosceuting witness' testimony ill 
a burglary case that defendant had "some features but not nil 
of the features" of the burglar she saw inside her apartment 
did not amount to an identification, evidence of her extra-
judicial identification of his photograph shortly after the crime 
was admissible. 
[3] Crimina.l La.w - Evidence - Identity. - Evidence of an extra-
judicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an 
identification made at the trial, but 8S independent evidence 
of identity. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-Evidellce of an extrajudicial iden-
tification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial 
[3] Extrajudicial identification of defendant in criminal case, 
note, 70 A.L.R. 1)10. See also Cal.Jut.2d, Evidence, § 179; Am.Jut., 
Evidence, § 350. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Burglary, § 29; [2] Burglary, § 24: 
(3-5] Criminal Law, § 314; (6] Crilllinal Law, § 287; (7] Crilllinlll 
Law, § 264; [H, DJ Cl'illlinal Law, § 1285; [10] Criminal Law, § 328: 
[11, 13] Criminal Law, ~ 4-1:1; [)2, H. l,jl Criminal Law, § 89.J; 
[16] Criminal Law, ~ :IS9(:1): [17-19] ('l'illlinni Law, § 1)65(1). 
) 
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identification is illlp('a~hl'd, IH''';;Hse the carli!'r identi1ication 
!tas gTP:lt<'r pl'obntin~ value thnn :1n i.il'ntilicatioll maue in the 
eourtl'OOl1l arter the slIggestiolls of others and the eirculll-
stances of the trial Illay haw il:tl'l'VC'ned to create a fancietl 
recognition in the wit lles~' min.!. 
[5] Id. - Evidence - Identity. - A witness' failure to repeat an 
extrajllllicial it!('ntifieation in cOllrt does not destroy its pro-
bative value, since snch fniil1l'e lIIay be explaineu by loss of 
memory or other cirCUllIstnnccs. The ('xtrajudicial identifica-
tion tends to COIllH'ct defendnnt with the crillle, and the prin-
cipal danger of admitting hearsay Hidenl!e is not present since 
the witness is tn-aibhle at the trial for cross-exalllination. 
[6] Id.-Rebuttal Evidence.-'Where testimony e1icitcd by defense 
counsel on cross-cxalllination ill a burglary casc gave rise to an 
inference that defen!lant's wife alltl her son Wl!re improperly 
detainell for the purpose of int1ucil'.:; t1rfend:lllt to confess, the 
prosecution was entitled to rebut this inference by eliciting 
a diflerent explanation for their arre~t. 
[7] Id.-Mistrial.-AssUllling that testimony of an officer in n bur-
glary case that after thl! arrest he found in defendant's home 
"numerous fur picces," which the prosecution elicited to rebut 
the inference e:,tablished by defense coullsel that defendant's 
wife and her SOll were improperly detained for the purpose of 
inducing defendant to confess, was struck on defendant's 
motion because the trial court found that its prejudicial effect 
exceeded its prohati\"(' value, it did not follow that a mistrial 
should have berll declarea where the refl'rellce to "fur pieces" 
was hrief and vague in its illlplications, it was struck immedi-
ately, the jury was admonisheu to disregaru it, anu further 
argument on the point took place out of the jury's hearing. 
[8] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury-Following Instructions.-
It must be nssumed that onlinarily adlllonitions to the jury 
are heeded. 
[9] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury-Following Instructions.-
A trial court's decision that an error or impropriety can be 
cured by admonition will not be re,ersed unless exceptional 
circumstances make it illlprohable that the jury obeyed the 
admonition. 
[10] Id.-Conduct of Judge.-Ruling,., of the trial court in granting 
a mistrial in a prior trial of a burglary case with regard to 
the sallle tcstilllony admitted in the present trial but struck 
imlllediately were not inconsistent, and the pro~('cution was not 
guilty of wilful mi<;conduct in reintroducing testimony previ-
ously held inalllllissible, where the t('stilllony was al'guabl~' 
adlllissihie at the second trial to 1'I'but an inference of 11\1-
propriety raised hy defense coullsrl, wItC're tlte record of tbe 
fir!:'t trial was lIot Lefore the l'e\·iewin;; c0urt, :1Ilt! where the 
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trial jud~e stated that the two situations were not "in the 
same cate;:rory" and did not have "the sallie srriou~ness." 
[111 Id.-Evidence-Admissions.-Where the prosecutill~ witness' 
idt>ntiUcation of dcft'lHlallt as the burglar who was in;:ide her 
apartment wa~ equivocal so as to make proof of h~s c'onnl'l'tion 
with the crillle d<'peuu on testimony as to his extrajudicial 
admission!:, the latter te:itimony was direct evid<'lll'e that the 
admissions were made but indirect evidence of the truth of 
what was admitted. (Code Ci'f'. Proc .. , § 1832.) 
(12) ld.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-The standard 
instructions on circmilstantial evidenee (namelr, that such 
cvidence Illu::;t be consistent with thc hypothe5is of defendant's 
guilt and ilTecolicilablc with any other rational conclusion) 
clnrify applieation of the general doctrine r<'quiring proof 
beyond a re:150nable doubt to a case in which defendnnt's guilt 
must be infcrred frol11 a pattern of incriminating eircum-
stances. They dl'al with proof of each fact which is essential 
to complete a chain of circulllstances that will establish de-
fendant's guilt, the me of evidence susceptible of two con-
structions or interpretations, nnd the relationship required 
between the proved circumstances and possible hypotheses; 
they should not he ginn when the problem of inferring guilt 
from a pattern of incriminating circuJllstances is not pl·esent. 
[13] ld.-Evidence-Admissions.-Testimony as to an extrajudicial 
admission is indirect evidence of the matter admitted heenuse 
the jurors are called on not only to believe what is said in 
court-thnt the admission was made-but to infer that the 
admission was true j such testimony is indirect evidence only 
because it is hearsay. 
[14] Id.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-The standard 
instructions on circumstantial evidence do not refer to the 
problem of cYnluating hearsay; they are unnecessary and may 
be misleading when the jury is to consider only whether a 
judicial admission was made and, if made, whether it wns tnlE'. 
[15] ld.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-The ~tandard 
instructions on circumstantial evidence arc not applicuble to 
evidcnce of extrajudicial admissions. (Disapproving state-
ments or implications to the eontrary in People Y. KnClIirf, 
20 C'n1.2d 87, 173 P.2d 1, and Pao1llc V. CllIuliottn, 128 Cal. 
App.2d 347, 275 P.2d 500.) 
[16] ld. - Evidence - Facts Showing Oonsciousness of Guilt.-
Statcl'aents of fact by defendant that were incredibl!', Inter 
proyed false or cOlltradicted by his suhsequent t!'stilliony may 
give rise to an inference of attempted cOll(,!'allllellt nntl COIl-
sciousness of g'uilt, hut >;1\ch inferell('e could not be dl'aWll 
[12] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Trill!, § 485; Am.Jur., 'rriul, § 77"2. 
) 
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where defell(lallt. when ai<ked on arrest where he had l.Jeeu 011 
the day of the erillH', alll't,!"e(lly rl'plied, "I <1on't know, but l.Jy 
the time I get to court I will ha\'e four or flve people to place 
me where I want to be." 
[17] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-An extrajudicial idcntification that 
cannot be confirm cd by an idl'ntifieation at the trial is insuffi-
eient to sustain a convietion in the ahscnee of othl'r evidence 
tending to connect defendant with the crime. 
[18] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-The probative value of an iden, 
tification depends on the circumstances under which it was 
made. \Vhere the prosecuting witness in a burglary case merely 
selected one of a slUall group of photographs as similar to the 
man she saw on the stcps outside her burglarized apartment, 
the small size of the group increased the danger of suggestion. 
[19] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-Identification from a still photo-
graph is l>ubstantially less reliable than identification of an 
individual seen in person; it becomes particularly suspect when 
the witness fails to identify the subject of the photograph 
when seen in person and there is no other evidence tending to 
identify him. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Herbert V. Walker, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed 
in part. 
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree burglary affirmed as to defendant Gould; reversed as 
to defendant Marudas. 
George Stahlman, Earle K. Stanton, Max Solomon, John J. 
Bradley, Palmer & Long and Dermot R. Long for Appellants. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Ernest E. Sanchez, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendants Jcwell Ashby 
Gould and Andrew Peter Marudas guilty of burglary in the 
second degree. Each defendant appeals from the judgment 
of conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
At the trial Mrs. :r.larguerite Fenwick testified that at noon 
on August 26, 1958, she left her apartment Oll Shoreham 
Drive and went to the swimming pool. ,'lltt'n site returned 
about six minutes later for suntan oil, she saw a man stamling 
on the steps outside her door and fonnd th(' door slig-htly ajar. 
She Raw a second man in her apartm(,llt who shouted: "Go 
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into the brLlroom and stay tl1p1'e." She walked towards the 
bedroom auu heard the front door close behind her. Looking 
out the window she saw the same two men running away. She 
subsequently noticed some coins on the floor and discovered 
that about $15 was missing from her purse. 
About 1 p. m. Officer Brewer arrived and showed Mrs. 
Fellwick sewn to ten slllall photographs. She selected two-
one of l\Iarudas as the man on the steps and one of Gould as 
the man inside her apartment. On several subsequent occasions 
she identified the same two photographs or enlargements 
thereof. 
Officer Cataldi testified that when arrested Gould at first 
denied knowledge of any burglary on Shoreham Drive. On 
being told that an eyewitness had identified him Gould said: 
"I know what you are talking about." He admitted taking 
"a few dollars" from the location and stated: "I don't recall 
whether I shimmed the door or the door was legally unlocked." 
\Vhen asked about his accomplice he said: "Why don't you 
check Pete? ... Pete Lombardi." Marudas at all times denied 
having any knowleuge of the burglary. 
At the trial Mrs. Fenwick pointed out Gould as having 
"some features but not all of the features" of the man she 
saw inside her apartment, and added that he seemed thinner 
than the burglar. She stated that she was unable to point out 
anyone in the courtroom as the man she saw on the steps. 
She also said that the pictures she selected shortly aft.er the 
crime "looked similar to the men who were in my apartment 
but not all the features were the same." Officer Brewer testi-
fied on cross-examination, however, that Mrs. Fenwick was 
sure of her identifications of the photographs at the time she 
first selected them. 
GOULD '8 ApPEAL 
[ 1 ] Gould contends that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain the verdict in that he was not adequately identified as 
the man Mrs. Fenwick saw in her apartment. It is true that 
Mrs. Fenwick's identification of Gould was inconclusive. Her 
testimony, however, adequately established that a burglary 
had been committed. Gould's admissiolls after his arrest could 
therefore be used to identify him as olle of the burg-lars (People 
v. Amaya, 40 Ca1.2d 70, 75-76 [251 P.2U 324]; People v. 
Mehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535, 544-545 [197 P.2d 12]; People v. 
Griffin, DB Cal.App.2d 1. 46-47 [219 P.2d 519]). and sustain 
the jury's finding that he participated in the crime. 
Gould ('ol1tel1(ls that the trial court erred in admitting evi-
) 
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deuce that Mrs. Fenwick identified his photograph shotlly 
after the crime. He asserts that Mrs. Fenwick did not identify 
him at the trial and that cviuence of an extrajudicial identifica-
tion is admissible only to corroborate an identification made 
at the trial by the same witness. 
[2] Mrs. li'cllwick testified that Gould had "some fea-
tures but not all of the features" of the burglar. She statcd 
that "the man who was in my apartnll'llt seemed to have-
he was a heavy man; he had rather fat cheeks and this man 
is very thin." Gould testified that nfter his arrcst he became 
"very ill" and that he had" hernia trouble," but he denied 
that he had lost weight. Mrs. Fenwick also testified that 
". . . it is awfully hard for me to point to someone after all 
of this time, saying that that is the person who looks like that 
person because my memory is rather vague about it now." 
Although her testimony did not amount to an identification, 
the evidence of her extrajudicial identification was nevertheless 
admissible. 
[3] Evidence of an extrajudicial identification is ad-
missible, not only to corroborate an idcntifi.!ation made at the 
trial (People v. Slobodion, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 560 (191 P.2d 1]), 
but as independent evidence of identity. [4] Unlike other 
testimony that caunot be corroborated by proof of prior con-
sistent statements unless it is first impeached (People v. JIa,.d-
enbrook,48 Ca1.2d 345, 351 [309 P.2d 424] ; People v. Kynettc, 
15 Ca1.2d 731, 753-754 [104 P.2d 794]), evidence of an extra-
judicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the 
testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier 
identification has greater probative value than an identifica-
tion made in the courtroom after the suggestion!'! of others 
and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to 
create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. (People v. 
Slobodioll, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 559-560 [191 P.2d 1] ; U'lliied States 
v. Forzallo, 190 F.2d 687, 689; see People v. Hood, 140 Cal. 
App.2d 585, 588 [295 P.2d 525] ; Peop7e v. Be1lnett, 11!J Cal. 
App.2d 224, 226 [259 P.2d 476] ; 4 Wigmore, Evidenc!' (3d 
ed. 1940), § 1130, p. 208.) [5] The failure of the witness 
to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not 
Ilestroy its probative value, for snch failurc may be explained 
hy loss of memory or other circumstances. The extrajudieial 
identification tends to conm'ct the defendant with the crime, 
and the principal danger of admitting hearsay e .... idence is 
not present since the witness is available at the trial for ('rOS8-
I'xamination. (See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 1i4-17!i [146 
) 
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A.2d :29, :12-;33 J ; McCormick, Evidence, § 39, p. 74; Morgan, 
Ilwnw!J Dallgers, 62 narv.L.Hev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wigmore, 
Evidcnce (3d cd. 1940), § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State 
v. Wil"vll, 38 \Vll.2d 593, 617-618 [231 P.2d 288, 300-301] ; 
People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202 [101 N.E.2d 457, 
460-461]. ) 
Gould contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dcclare a mistrial. Officer Cataldi testified that he 
and other officers arrested Gould at his home on September 
5, 1938, at approximately 10 p. m. On cross-examination de-
fense counsel brought out that Gould's wife and her 14-year-
old son were taken into custody at the same time, that they 
were not released until 5 a. m. the next morning, and that no 
charges were filed against them. By his questions counsel 
suggested that Gould was aware of their detention and was 
disturbed by it during the period in which he allegedly ad-
mitted committing the burglary. On redirect examination the 
assistant district attorney asked if there was any reason for 
arresting Gould's wife and her son. Over defendant's objec-
tion the officer replied that a search of Gould's home following 
his arrest revealed "numerous fur pieces." Defendant's 
motion to strike this answer was granted and the jury was 
admonished to disregard the answer and any inference to be 
drawn therefrom. Defendant then moved to declare a mis-
trial, contending that the prejudicial effect of the officer's 
testimony could not be cured by a mere admonition. 
[6] The testimony elicited by defense counsel on cross-
examination gave rise to an inference that Gould's wife and 
her son were improperly detained for the purpose of inducing 
Gould to confess.1 The prosecution was entitled to rebut this 
inference by eliciting a different explanation for their arrrst. 
[7] 'Ye assume that the proffered evidence was struck be-
cause the trial court found that its prejudicial effect exceeded 
its probative value. Even on this assumption, however, it does 
not follow that a mistrial should have been declared. The 
reference to "fur pieces" was brief and vague in its implica-
tions; it was struck immediately; the jury was admonished 
to disrrgard it; and further ar:,rument on thr point took place 
out of the jury's hearing. [8] It mnst be assumed that 
ordinarily admonitions to the jury are heeded. (People Y. 
Fnotr" 48 Ca1.2d 20, 23 [306 P.2d 8031 ; P('oz>le v. Tarantino, 
45 Ca1.2d fi90, 597-598 [290 P.2d 50!)] ; P('ople v. Dabb. 32 
'On this appeal, however, Gould does not contend that his admissions 
\\'~rc in\·o]unt::ry. 
) 
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Ca1.2d 491, 499 [197 P .2d 11.) [ 9 ] • \ ll'ietl l'ollrt's llceisioJl 
that an crror or illl}>l'Opl'il'ty l'all he ("lll'l'd by admonition will 
not be reversed ulIies,; l'Xt:I'ptional l'il'Clllllstalwl's make it il11-
probablc that the jul'Y obeyed the lllltnonitioll. (Sec People\'. 
Foote, 48 Ca1.2d 20, 24 [306 1'.2d 803] ; People v. Zamillora, 
66 Cal.App.2d 166, 212 [152 P.2d 180J.) No such circum-
stances appear ill thc prescnt rase. 
[10] Gould asserts that two days bcforc giving the testi-
mony as to fur picces Offieer Cataldi gave similar testimony 
and that the same trial judge at that time granted defendants' 
motion to declare a mistrial. Gould contends that the trial 
court's rulings were inconsistent and that the prosecution 
committed wilful misconduct ill reintroducing' tt'Btimony previ-
ously held inadmissible. At the second trial, however, the 
testimony was arguably admissible to rebut the inference of 
impropriety raised by defcnse l'Ollllsel. The reeord of the first 
trial is not before us and we are not aware of the circulllstanees 
preceding the earlier ruling. The trial judge stated that th(' 
two situations were not" in the same category" and did nor 
have "the same seriousness." Accordingly, no inconsistcnc~ 
or wilful misconduct appears. 
Gould contends that his identification as one of the bur-
glars depended chiefly on circumstantial evidence and that 
the trial court therefore erred in refusing to give certain 
standard instructions on circumstantial evidence.2 [11] Since 
Mrs. Fenwick's identification of Gould was equivocal, proof 
of his connection with the crime depended on testimony as to 
his extrajudicial admissions. Such testimony is direct evidence 
that the admissions were made but: indirect evidence of the 
truth of what was admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1832; People 
"The following instructions ,vere rcquested by Gould and \'efused by 
the trial court: 
"If the. evidence in this case [as to any particular count] is susceptible 
of two constructions or interpretations, each of which appeors to you 
to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, 
nnd the other to his innocence, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt 
that interpretation which will admit of def~ndllnt 's innotence, and reject 
that which points to his guilt, 
"You will notice that this rule applies' only when l)oth of the two 
possible opposing conclusions appear to YOll to be r('asonahle. If. on th,' 
other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to he 
rcasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to 
ndhere to the rt'llsonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, Lcar· 
ing in mind, however, that even if the reasonable de,luction points to 
defendant's guilt, the entire proof must e~rry the convincing force reo 
quired by law to support a verdict of guilt. : 
"1 instruct you further that you are nol Pt'flllittl'll, on ('irtllm~tulltial 
c\'idcnce alone, or when circumstantial evial'lIce i~ ~u\'stalllially relied 011 
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v. ](oclIig, 29 Ca1.2d 87, 91 [li3 P.2d 1J.) We have concluded, 
for reasons that appear below, that the requested instructions 
do not apply to all types of indirect evidence and that they 
were properly refused in the present case. 
[12] The requested instructions clarify the application 
of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt to a case in which the defcndant's guilt must be inferred 
from a pattern of incriminating circulllstances. (See People v. 
Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [150 P.2d 812J; People v. 
Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 154-155 [146 P.2d 469].) They 
deal with proof of "each fact which is essential to complete 
a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant's 
guilt, " the use of evidence" susceptible of two constructions or 
interpretations," and the relationship required between" the 
proved circumstances" and possible hypotheses. Such instruc-
tions should not be giYen when the problem of inferring guilt 
from a pattern of incriminating circumstances is not present. 
[13] Testimony as to an extrajudicial admission is indirect 
evidence of the matter admitted because the jurors are called 
upon not only to believe what is said in court-':"'that the admis-
sion was made--but to infer that the admission was true. 
(People v. Koenig, 29 Ca1.2d 87, 91 [173 P.2d 1].) Thus such 
testimony is indirect evidence only because it is hearsay. 
[14] The requested instructions on circumstantial evidence 
clearly do not refer to the problem of evaluating hearsay. They 
are unnecessary, and may be misleading, when the jury is to 
consider only whether the admission was made, and if made, 
whether it was true. (People v. Bretagna, 298 N.Y. 323, 326 
[83 N.E.2d 537, 538] ; see Morgan, Adllll:ssions and the Hear-
say Rule, 30 Yale L.J. 355, 356-358.) 
[15] Other jurisdictions agree, though on somewhat dif-
ferent grounds, that the standard instructions on circumstan-
tial evidence are not applicable to evidence of extrajudicial 
admissions. (Annot., 40 A.L.R. 571; 22 C.J.S., § 530, p. 839, 
§ 816 subsec. a., p. 1422 and Supp. 1960,p. 313; 1 Underhill, 
in the People's case, to find the defendant guilty of rthe] [any] erime 
charged against him unless the pro\'cd circumstances not only are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that thc defendant is guilty of the crime, but 
are irreconcilahle with any other rational conclusion. 
"\Vhen the case which has hecn made out hy the Pcople against a 
defendant re,ts entirely or chiefly on cireumstantial evidence, and in any 
case before the jury may fin<1 a defendant guilty basing its fiuding solely 
on such evidence. earh fact which is t'sRential to complete a chain of 
circuDl~tances that will e~tablish the defendant's guilt must he proved 




PEOPLE v. GOULD [54 C.2rl 
Criminal Evidence (5th ed. 1956), § 19, p. 27.) Research has 
failed to reveal any case from another jurisdiction holding 
otherwise, except Damas v. People, 62 Colo. 418 [163 P. 289, 
L.R.A. 1917D 591], which was expressly <lverruled in Mitchell 
v. People, 76 Colo. 346 [232 P. 685, 40 A.L.R. 566]. 
In People v. Koenig, 29 Ca1.2d 87 [173 P.2d 1], we noted 
tbat section 1832 of the Code of Civil Procedure cites testi-
mony as to an ex.trajudicial admission as an example of 
"indirect evidence" and we concluded that the refusal to give 
a requested instruction on circumstantial evidence was errone-
ous. In that case, however, the prosecution relied heavily on 
proof of incriminating circumstances other than the defcnd-
ant's alleged admissions. The requested instruction on cir-
cumstantial evidence was appropriate there without regard 
to the testimony 8." to admissions, since the jury might have 
believed the defendant's denial that he made the admissions 
and yet have iuferred his guilt from the other incriminating 
circumstances alone. (People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 
153 [146 P.2d 469] ; see People v. Zerillo, 36 Ca1.2d 222, 233 
[223 P.2d 223] ; People v. Sz:meone, 26 Ca1.2d 795, 807 [161 
P .2d 369].) Since the statutory definition of "indirect evi-
dence" includes both hearsay and presumptions (Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 1957-1963), to which the requested instructions on 
cireumstantial evidence obviously do not apply, it could not 
have been its purpose to affect the giving of those instructions. 
Any statements or implications to the contrary in People v. 
Koenig, supra, and People v. Candiotto, 128 Cal.App.2d 347 
[275 P.2d 500], are disapproved. 
Gould's contentions are without merit and his conviction 
must be affirmed. 
M:ARUDAS' ApPEAL 
Marudas contends that the evidence tending to identify 
him as the man Mrs. Fenwick saw on the steps outside her 
apartment was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Mrs. 
Fenwick testified that she ~ras unable to point out anyone 
in the courtroom as the man she saw 011 the steps. Gould did 
not identify Marudas as his accomplice, but suggested that 
the police check one" Pete I.lombardi." Unlike Gonld. Marudas 
at all times denied having any knowledge of the burglary. 
The People contend, however, that Marudas' conviction should 
be sustained on the basis of an allegedly evasive statement 
made by him at the time of his arrest and Mrs. Fenwick's 
extrajudicial identification of his photograph. 
[16] When asked upon arrest where he had heen on the 
) 
) 
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day of the cri!ll~, ~Ianltlas alleg,'dly replicll: "1 dOIl't know, 
but by the time 1 get to court 1 will havc four or five people 
to place me where 1 want to be." 'fhe People contend that this ' 
auswer was so evasive and equivocal that the jury could 
properly infer consciousness or guilt. The cases citell by the 
People, howcver, im'o!yed statements of fact that were ill-
cr('dible, later proYed false, or contradicted by the tlefendant 's 
subsequent testimony. (People v. lV'i,~sc1ifcld, 36 Ca1.2<l 758. 
761-763 [227 P.2d 833] ; People v. Oole, HI Cal. 88, 89·90 
l74 P. :,}47]; People v. Turner, 86 Cal.App.2d 791, SOO·801 
[195 P.2d SOH].) Such statements give rise to inferences of 
attempted cOll(;ealmcnt and consciousness of guilt. No com-
parable falsification or evasion was shown in the present ('ase 
and cou,;L"iollS!leSS of guilt could 110t reasonably be inferred. 
The ouly evidence tending to eonncct Marullas with the bur-
glary, therefore, was the evidence of Mrs. Fenwick's extra· 
judicial identification of his photograph. 
[17] An extrajudidal identification that cannot be con. 
firmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sus-
tain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to 
conllect the defendant with the crime. (Sec Reamer v. United 
State.~, 229 F.2d 884, 886.) [18] Moreover, the probative 
value of an idpntification depends on the circumstances under 
which it was made. Mrs. Fenwick merely selected one of a 
small group of photographs. TIle small size of the group in· 
creased the danger of suggestion. (See 3 Wigmore, Evidence 
(3d ed. 1940), § 786a, p. 164.) [19] Identification from a 
still photograph is substantially less reliable than identification 
of an individual seen in person. (See id., pp. 165-166.) It 
becom!'s particularly suspect when, as in the present case, the 
witness subsequcntly fails to identify tbe subject of the photo-
graph \\"11f:n secn in person and th('re is no other evidence 
tcnding' to idelltify him. 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed 
as to defendant .J ewell Ashby Gould and revcrsed as to de-
fendant Andrew Peter Marudas. 
Gibson. C. .T., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., 
Dooling, J., and Coughlin, J. pro tern.,· concnrred. 
Respomlent's petition for a rclH~aring was deni('d September 
20, 1960. Conghlin, .T. pro tern.,· partit'ipated therein in place 
of Whitt', .J . 
• A~siKlll'!l 1Iy Chairman of Judieifll Council. 
